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Abstract 
This paper begins with an evaluation of the performance of the Malaysian market for financial 
derivatives.  Despite a headstart, Malaysia appears to be lagging substantially when compared to 
the performance of other Asian derivative markets.  While the other Asian markets though newer, 
have seen explosive growth in volume, trading volume in Malaysia appears to have shrunk.  We 
examine why this has been the case and identify several macro and micro level impediments.  
Among macro level impediments have been the imposition of Capital controls, reduced equity 
market volatility, falling interest rates and a fragmented regulatory/operational structure.  The 
lack of market makers, regulation and settlement rules were identified as impediments at the 
market micro structure level. 
 
We propose several measures to develop  the local derivatives market.  This includes, privatizing 
and deregulating risk management, facilitating market making, liberalization of unit trust 
guidelines with regard to their use of derivatives and the initiation of derivative funds.  We also 
recommend the reactivation of securities borrowing and lending, introduction of new derivative 
products and streamlining of licensing / regulations. 
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1.0: Introduction 
 
 
In 1986 a year after the  Pan Electric fiasco, there was a conference in which the theme 
was “Bringing Back the Investors”. Today, more than 15 years later, that  theme may be  
applicable once again. In the mid-1990s there were conferences to raise issues about 
how to develop market liquidity in existing and new derivative exchanges. Almost 10 
years later, we are again challenging ourselves to improve liquidity in derivative 
products. 
 
The market for Financial derivatives has seen phenomenal growth over recent years. 
Aggregate trading volume world wide has been setting new records the last few years.  It 
appears that 2003 is likely to be another such year.  Some of the most spectacular of 
this growth has been in Asia’s markets.   Exchanges in Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Taiwan have seen blowout growth rates.   So much so that today, an Asian 
exchange holds pole position as the world’s leading derivatives exchange by number of 
contracts written. The KSE (Korea Stock Exchange) KOSPI 200, option contract is the 
highest traded derivative contract in the world. This rapid growth in trading volume on 
Asian Exchanges has been a largely post crisis phenomenon. The record growth in 
traded volumes have not been temporary.   They  have remained high for at least the 
last 2 years and are likely to be repeated in 2003. The graph below shows the volumes 
on several Asian derivatives exchanges. 
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Figure 1 
 
(*The Korea Stock Exchange is not shown due to scaling) 
 
Sadly, these impressive growth appears to have by passed Malaysia.  It is notable that 
Malaysia has had the experience of not only having had one of Asia’s oldest derivatives 
exchanges but of having three different derivatives exchanges – for commodities, fixed 
income and equity products. In the case of financial derivatives, Malaysia introduced the 
KLCI futures ahead of India, Taiwan and Korea. Yet trading volume in these three 
countries is today much higher than Malaysia. If one bears in mind that SGX is active in 
several products which do not naturally originate from Singapore, the Malaysian 
experience is one of an opportunity lost. In this paper we try to examine why this has 
been the case, what have been the impediments that have retarded growth and what 
can be done. 
 
Section 2:  Derivatives In Malaysia 
 
The first Malaysian  derivative exchange was the KLCE, established in 1980. The 
exchange’s maiden derivative product was the Crude Palm Oil (CPO) contract which 
was introduced that same year. The CPO futures contract was then the only one of its 
kind in the world. Despite introducing several other commodity derivatives - on Rubber, 
Tin, Cocoa etc. - the CPO contract has remained the main product. Other commodity 
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derivatives never ‘took off’, perhaps because there were already good substitute 
contracts traded on other exchanges such as  in London. 
 
 
Undeterred, Malaysia introduced  financial derivatives in 1995 with the introduction of the 
KLSE CI Stock Index Futures contracts on what was then  the Kuala Lumpur Options 
and Financial Futures Exchange (KLOFFE). In 1997, yet another new exchange, the 
Malaysian Monetary Exchange (MME) was launched to introduce and trade the 3 month 
KLIBOR contract.  Thus, we had three exchanges trading three derivative products.  
CPO futures on the  KLCE, Stock Index Futures on KLOFFE and 3 month KLIBOR 
futures on MME. 
  
 
In the case of the main financial derivative the KLSE CI  contract, it made what looked 
like a very promising start. Volume and Open Interest rose steadily over the first 30 
months to peak  at 4,600 and 18,400 contracts per day respectively in 1998. This was 
certainly impressive. Nearly half the users of the KLCI futures contracts were foreign 
institutions and investors. However, that growth came crashing down (as did turnover in 
the underlying equity market) with the imposition of capital controls (see Graph 2). For 
the subsequent 30 month until approximately mid 2001, volume and open interest 
averaged barely 1,000 and 2,000 contracts respectively.  
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Graph  2 
 
 
The KLIBOR futures contract shows a similar trend. Monthly trading volume which 
averaged 4,820 contracts in the 2 years prior to capital controls fell 60% to 1,900 
contracts in the subsequent year.  The contract that has been the worst off have been 
the equity options.  Despite having been introduced almost 3 years ago, (Dec. 2000) 
index options have hardly seen any  activity.  These contracts have been characterized 
by long stretches of zero trading volume. (See Graph 3). 
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The three exchanges, KLCE. KLOFFE  and MME have now been consolidated into a 
single exchange,  the Malaysian Derivatives Exchange (MDEX). Thus, we now have 
commodity, equity and interest rate derivatives available on MDEX. However the 
comparative performance between this exchange and other Asian derivative exchanges 
leaves much to be desired.  Thus far, none of Malaysia’s financial derivatives have been 
successful in terms of meeting a rule of thumb for success, which is that turnover value 
should  equal the value of turnover in the underlying market.  
 
So what has gone wrong?  Why has Malaysia lagged despite having introduced 
derivatives earlier? There are several reasons why it should have succeeded, first, there 
are no substitutes to Malaysian equity derivatives traded elsewhere (unlike Nikkei). 
Second, one cannot fault availability of trading infrastructure nor high transaction costs. 
Third, it is notable that the last twenty years has seen significant off-exchange traded 
derivatives activity in forward contracts and OTC equity options.  We believe there are 
several obstacles that have impeded the growth of exchange traded derivative products. 
We see these impediments at both the Macro-Level and at the market micro-structure 
level. 
 
Macroeconomic policy and Impediments 
 
In the run up to the Asian currency crisis, Malaysia had embarked on a process of 
market liberalization. What that did was to increase the risk exposure of leveraged 
corporations and entrepreneurs. These leveraged corporations and entrepreneurs had 
borrowed in local and foreign currency against equity assets.  These were the very 
assets that currency traders and investors disposed of during 1997 and 1998.  The 
policy reaction to the financial crisis had major implications to exchange traded 
derivatives. 
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(i) Capital Controls 
The first macro-level impediment is  the imposition of currency controls.  This marked 
Malaysia as the one Asian economy that reacted to free market volatility by imposing 
controls. As we saw in Figure 1, much of Asia’s growth in trading volume had come from 
foreign  participation. This foreign participation has been either for purpose of hedging 
existing exposures in the country or to gain new exposure (long as well as short).   As a 
result of the moratorium on capital movements, major foreign financial institutions and 
investors stopped trading in Malaysia.  
 
This has had a major impact on the asset and derivative markets. That Malaysia has not 
seen the same level of foreign participation, despite offering the same types of products 
at similar if not lower costs probably has to do with perceived regulatory risk. 
 
In addition,  following the imposition of currency and investment controls,  the Malaysian 
authorities embarked on a policy of market intervention to provide a safety net for 
affected corporations and entrepreneurs. This had other  implications. 
 
(ii) Falling Equity Market Volatility 
The Second impediment was that  equity market volatility fell significantly following 
Capital Controls.   Government and government related investment agencies became 
the major investors in the equity market. The government became the buyer of last 
resort including the taking over of major corporations. This had the effect of reducing the 
downside volatility of the market. From levels comparable with the Korean equity market  
during the period 1993 till 1998, volatility of the KLCI has fallen steadily in the period 
1998 to 2003. The reduction has been so substantial that KLCI volatility has been equal 
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if not lower than the volatility of gold, for much 2002 and 2003.  Figure 4 below shows 
the situation. 
 
Figure 4:  Trends In Equity Market Volatility 
 
As a rule, low volatility is anathema to derivatives. There are two ways by which low 
underlying market volatility hurts derivatives - volume impact and value impact. First, 
reduced volatility simply means reduced pre cautionary demand – the need to hedge, 
and therefore reduced demand for derivatives for purpose of hedging. Low volatility also 
reduces the speculative demand for derivatives. Secondly, reduced volatility reduces the 
value of derivatives – especially options.  The value of  an option is directly related to 
expected volatility. 
 
(iii) Falling Interest Rate Regime 
If the falling equity market volatility hurt equity derivatives, the falling interest rate 
environment post crisis has dampened growth of the interest rate derivatives. This has to 
do with the fact that for financial institutions, which are potentially the key users of 
interest derivatives, rising, not falling interest rates, are what they worry about. Rising 
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interest rates can play havoc with asset-liability side durations, gaps and net worth and 
squeeze interest spreads. Falling interest rates on the other hand can have the opposite 
impact. Thus,  banks have far less exposure to rate risk when rates are falling.  In such a 
‘favorable’ environment, there is little need for a financial institution to hedge. 
 
(iv) Regulatory / Structural Fragmentation 
Malaysia’s derivative exchanges may be victims to an unchanged pattern of 
“fragmentation” in Malaysia’s financial market development. Policy makers appear to 
have a bias towards micro managing markets.  The result has been a fragmented 
regulatory and structural framework. 
 
For example, during the 1980s, the impact of a fragmented regulatory market 
mechanism made it extremely difficult for new products to be introduced to the market. 
Initiators of new products would have to contend with  nearly half a dozen government 
agencies and departments.   The result was regulatory inefficiency.  Thus, the 1980s 
model was one where there were  several external bodies overseeing one market. 
 
 
There was recognition of this issue in the 1990s.  The creation of the SC was a major 
step forward towards the concept of one regulator for the overall market. The SC 
consolidated the regulatory fragmentation. Financial liberalization and new product 
innovation were also encouraged.   However,  the regulatory fragmentation that had 
frustrated the development of an efficient securities market was replaced by operational 
fragmentation at  the level of markets. While there was now one regulator,  the KLSE 
was now complemented by the KLCE, KLOFFE, MME and a securities 
borrowing/leading  market not to mention MESDAQ. The vision of one regulator,  and 
one  market became in reality, one regulator, two Acts and many markets. This had the 
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impact of repeating the inefficiencies of bureaucratic fragmentation into  inefficiencies 
caused by market fragmentation. The result was improved regulatory efficiency but 
increased operational inefficiency. The tables below provide a simplified representation 
of the underlying market realities. 
 
1980s model 
Ministry PMD MOF MITI MITI 
Regulator FIC CIC ROC Takeover Panel 
Market KLSE 
 
1990s model 
Policy Maker PMD MOF   
Regulator FIC SC   
Market KLSE KLOFFE MME KLCE 
 
 
Micro management of the market appears to be the thrust of policy.  This has been by 
way of direct policies such as freezing new listings, prohibiting forward contracts or 
freezing securities borrowing and lending and new derivative products as well as indirect 
policies such as requiring option contracts to be permitted on a case by case basis. That 
such intervention is always has a cost – increased price distortion; appears to have been 
lost. 
 
In summarizing this point; one should be aware that one of the inherent market 
development features of Asian economies has been a history of developing ‘Fish Trap’ 
markets. A fish trap market is one in which national savings are directed as investment 
into mandated sectors.   This feature is prevalent in more than one Asian economy and 
Malaysia has not been immune from this trend. In the case of the derivative industry, the 
historical repetition is that the development of “fragmentation” in the form of a 
fragmented market structure has “directed” investment away from the derivative market 
and sustained low efficiency in the derivatives industry.  
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Impediments at the Market Microstructure Level 
 
Aside from the above macro level impediments, there exist several impediments at the 
market microstructure level.  Of these, the important ones are (i) The lack of market 
makers, (ii) Trading settlement rules which bias against derivatives and (iii)  Regulation.  
 
Lack of Market Makers 
 
In developed derivative and securities exchanges, market makers exist to facilitate 
market liquidity.  The rationale is that market makers smoothen and provide continuity of 
trades and therefore play a key role in preventing trading seizures.  Korea, Singapore 
and the other Asian markets have market makers.  The lack of market makers and the 
attendant problems of liquidity, appears to be the main stumbling block to participation of 
institutional players.  The current situation is therefore akin to a catch 22 situation.  
Without sufficiently deep markets, institutional players cannot participate and without 
institutional participation one cannot have liquid markets. 
 
Comparative Lack of Leverage 
The Leverage inherent in derivatives is a key attraction for their use. However this 
attraction is comparatively muted in the case of Malaysian Equity derivatives. The T + 3 
settlement enables the purchase of shares for no immediate cash outflow. Payment only 
needs to be made 3 working days later. The current practice of T + 3 day settlement for 
stocks not only neutralizes the leverage attraction of equity derivatives but works against 
it. By comparison, players in the derivative markets are required to deposit immediate 
margin payment.  Furthermore, with margin financing available for stocks, leveraged 
plays are more favorable with stocks than equity derivatives. In comparison, the  T + 1 
settlement in other developed markets effectively reduces this distortion. 
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Regulation 
Overall, the regulatory policy stance is one of ambivalence and suspicion towards 
derivatives. This is visible from the : 
 
(i) Ban on Short Selling 
The prohibition of short selling has a direct impact on trading volume of equity 
derivatives. Arbitrage, a key use of financial derivatives, is made impossible 
when short-selling is prohibited. In addition, the prohibition also prevents the 
hedging of long positions in derivatives for passively hedged ‘long volatility’ 
positions.  
 
(ii) Limitation of use by local  Investment Institutions 
There are limits on investment in derivatives by professionally managed Unit 
Trust / Mutual Funds. Unit Trusts are not allowed to buy derivatives as 
substitutes for market exposure in their portfolios. Unit trusts may only use 
futures to hedge their portfolios. Though they are now allowed to take hedging 
positions, their total exposure to derivatives is capped at 10% of total NAV.   This 
restriction has effectively meant that with the exit of foreign institutional users 
after the imposition of capital controls, there was no replacement for their activity. 
 
(iii) Segregation of Licensing and Trading 
MDEX is part of the KLSE. But the existence of the SIA (Securities Industry Act) 
and FIA (Futures Industry Act) means that while a single license is sufficient for 
all other KLSE products, Derivatives require an additional special license. This 
special license however,  only allows them to trade on a specific set of derivative 
instruments.   Licensed futures dealers may deal in futures and warrants on 
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MDEX but not in warrants or call warrants on the KLSE (even though their 
expertise makes them eminently qualified to do so). Until recently, dealing 
representatives had to take different futures exam modules for commodities and 
index futures. 
 
Licensed dealers typically require two sets of infrastructure to deal in equity and 
derivatives.  In addition, dealers representatives and investment managers have 
to incur high costs in dealing in derivatives.   Apart from  taking an additional 
exam (the MFORR exam), they need to purchase a separate dealing machine 
(the KATS machine), manage separate clearing (though MDCH and SCANS 
have merged, clearing remains separate) and bear the costs of an inefficient 
non-cross marginable mark to market and mark to book system. Thus,  as things 
now stand,  the net impact of all this segregation is that, for brokers, derivatives 
are a low volume, low margin but high cost product. As a result,   an additional 
five, big name futures operations were closed down in 2002 and 2003 (Maybank, 
Hong Leong, Amanah, Affin, Profutures). 
 
The above micro market regulations and inconsistencies have the net effect of 
providing impediments which are inimical to the long term goal of Capital Market 
development. There are obvious benefits to be derived from a well functioning 
market in derivatives. While it is not our purpose here  to argue the case of the 
benefits of derivatives, The following is a summary of their key benefits: 
 
(i) Lower Cost of Hedging 
 
 Lowers funding costs. 
 Globalizes costs of capital. 
 Promotes/enhances competitiveness. 
 Provides incentive to produce more since price risk is reduced. 
 
 
 15
  (ii) Efficient Allocation of Risk 
 
 Redistributes /diffuses risk 
 Enables the different risk components of a product to be separated 
and traded/managed 
 Enables improved management of risk 
 
(iii) Improves pricing efficiency / eliminates distortions. 
 
 Possibility of arbitrage eliminates mispricing. 
 Also increases risk for market/price manipulators. 
 
(iv) Key Source of Information about Market Expectations for: 
 
 Policy makers 
 Producers / consumers 
 
 
 
Section 4:  Overcoming the Impediments 
 
 
Of late, some of the macro level impediments cited earlier, appear to be turning 
favourable. The stock market has seen a return of volume, volatility and a generally 
bullish undertone. Interest rates appear to have stopped falling and look likely to reverse 
trend. Both these factors should favour increased use of equity and interest rate 
derivatives. However the lack of liquidity remains a key impediment, any attempt to 
ameliorate the situation must therefore work to enhance liquidity. Thus, the main 
initiatives should be: 
 
(i) Deregulate/Privatize Risk Management 
 
A more positive overall policy stance towards deregulation and liberalization 
would go a long way in enhancing necessary growth in the use of derivatives. To 
paraphrase Milton Friedman,  the role of the regulator is to ensure that when the 
markets are exuberent that there are increased controls and to ensure that when 
the market is pessimistic, that there is liquidity. In the current global environment, 
a policy of centralization and managed markets is misplaced.  Regulators should 
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be looking at curbing potential market excesses and unusual bouts of over 
exuberance. However in order to achieve this, it  would mean reducing the 
substantial advantages enjoyed in the previous “fish-trap” system. 
 
 There are two key issues that we propose here.  First, is the decentralization of 
savings/deposits.  Liberalizing central savings with the EPF and increasing the 
amount investable with private mutual funds would go a long way in developing 
the fund management industry. Currently EPF savings can only  be managed by 
the EPF or directed to bank backed fund managers.  While this may seem an 
efficient way to centralize the pool of savings, the long term liability of 
guaranteeing the savings is borne by the government.   Aside from concentrating 
risk and accentuating Moral Hazard, as guarantor, the government, in the 
parlance of derivatives, is the issuer of a substantial amount of put options.  Such 
a short position in puts, implies potentially unlimited downside risks. 
 
 
Our second proposal is the decentralization of risk management.  The 
management of risk, in particular key risks such as currency and interest rate risk 
have been in the domain of the Central Bank. In essence, these risks were being 
managed by BNM on behalf of the nation.  As a result, both public and private 
sector entities have been lulled into not paying enough attention to these risks. 
Furthermore, such paternalistic policies have stunted the possible growth of a 
risk-management industry. The advent of the Asian currency crisis has shown 
the fallacy of this arrangement.   In the long term there is a clear need to 
“privatize” risk management by making economic entities responsible for 
managing their own risks. This prevents the government and ultimately the 
citizens as the last provider of insurance.
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(ii) Facilitate More Market Making 
 
The presence of market makers will smoothen and certainly enhance liquidity. As 
a starting point, institutions such as PNB, through a subsidiary could take on this 
task with minimum risk. The risk is minimised since PNB is invested in the 
underlying stocks. Any hedging activity undertaken would have the effect of 
taking active positions in quasi or synthetic fixed income positions (which is also 
part of their investment mandate). From a risk profile sense, this proposal is 
based on the same principal as Khazanah issuing covered warrants. 
 
(iii) Liberalize restrictions on unit trust/mutual funds 
As long as mutual funds use derivatives for hedging purposes, the 10% cap is  
unnecessary.  Aside from removing an unnecessary handicap, such liberalization 
helps  improve liquidity in derivatives and enables local mutual funds to better 
manage their risk. 
(iv) Initiate Derivative Funds 
The establishment of investment funds specializing in derivatives is overdue.  
There is no reason why those willing to take on the risk should be denied.  
Especially when such an initiative can contribute substantially to liquidity and 
thereby benefit other mutual funds that would want to hedge. 
(v) Reactivate Securities Borrowing And Lending 
The reactivation of securities borrowing and lending can have several positive 
effects.  First, it can rekindle interest in derivatives since many derivative 
strategies would be possible.  Additionally, it would enhance arbitrage activity 
and thereby enhance pricing efficiency. 
(vi) Broaden Product Range – Introduce New Products 
A key catalyst fuelling growth in the other Asian Markets have been Single Stock 
Futures (SSF).  Though announced, its introduction has been long delayed here. 
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(vii) Streamline Licensing Requirements 
That an FBR has to spend time, ”intense” effort and money to meet licensing 
requirements has been a long standing complaint.  Streamlining the fragmented 
operational framework should also help. 
(viii) Enhance Investor Education 
Despite good effort by the exchanges and the SC, awareness of derivatives is 
still low. Investing more in investor education should be prioritized. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The first section of this paper  compared the performance of the Malaysian derivative 
exchange to other Asian derivative exchanges. The indications are that the local 
exchange is a laggard compared to other exchanges.   Some of the regional exchanges 
have achieved outstanding success notably the Korean derivatives exchange.  That 
Malaysia has lagged despite having had a headstart is worrying. 
 
In the second section, we have attempted to identify and understand the issues that may 
be impeding the development of derivative products. At the macro level we suggest that 
currency controls, policies of managing market volatility and interest rates and the 
continuance of market fragmentation have  each played a role in reducing the growth of 
the local derivatives market. At the micro level the absence of market makers, leverage 
and ambivalent regulation have not encouraged their use.  
 
In part three we have suggested seven  measures to improve the local derivatives 
market.  This  includes privatizing and deregulating risk management, facilitating market 
making, liberalization of unit trust guidelines with regard to the use of derivatives and the 
initiation of derivative funds.  We also recommend the  reactivation of securities 
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borrowing and lending, the introduction of new derivative products, stream-lining of 
licensing and continued investor education. 
 
Looking back at policy evolution, it may once have appeared possible to guarantee a 
2020 result by adopting the tried and tested Korean and Japanese models of a managed 
economy.  However, the Japanese meltdown and the Asian Currency crisis 
demonstrated that there is no guarantee to a continuously rising market.  Risks are a 
reality and need to be managed.  Reacting to the crisis, Korean authorities have taken 
the lessons to heart and have vigorously implemented a market structure to enable more 
risk management freedom to individuals, corporations and foreign investors.  The result 
has been a more vigorous and thriving capital market. 
 
A thriving derivatives market is no guarantee that there will not be another financial 
crisis. However, the existence of such markets with a good measure of the features 
proposed above will provide players who are aware of the risks, the means to mitigating 
them. This is the way by which markets allow for the survival of strong entities and the 
end of weaker ones. 
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